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ABSTRACT 
This study is an analysis of differences between unmanned and manned aviation 
industry safety.  A survey tool was used to collect safety perception, risk perception, and 
organizational safety culture data from various individuals throughout the aviation 
industry.  In general, no difference existed between the unmanned and manned groups, 
indicating an overall safe operating environment for aviators.  While the results of this 
limited study show no overall difference between groups, it provides a baseline study for 
which future data, collected from a more mature industry, can be obtained. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“I was always afraid of dying. Always. It was my fear that made me learn 
everything I could about my airplane and my emergency equipment, and 
kept me flying respectful of my machine and always alert in the cockpit.” 
Chuck Yeager        
 True to their name, operators or pilots control unmanned aircraft from remote 
locations ranging from mere feet to thousands of miles.  Technological advancements 
further increase unmanned aircraft operators’ ability to expand the physical distance 
between themselves and the aircraft.  A typical unmanned aircraft system consists “of an 
unmanned or remotely piloted aircraft, the human element, payload, control elements, 
and data link communication architecture” (Barnhart, et al., 2015, p.17).  The safety and 
reliability of the non-human aspects of these systems benefit from increasing 
technological capabilities and increased reliability of redundant control methods 
(Bolkcom, 2004).  While the unmanned aircraft industry continues to benefit from new 
technology, it is possible that taking the human out of the aircraft may pose adverse 
consequences.  The Department of Defense (DoD) “estimated that UASs suffered 
accidents at a rate of 10 to 100 times that of what is observed in manned aircraft, with 
operator error accounting for approximately 20 percent of all mishaps” (Barnhart, et al., 
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2015, p.166).  In a report for Congress, Bolkcom adds, “If control systems fail in a 
manned aircraft, a well-trained pilot is better positioned to find the source of the problem 
because of his/her physical proximity” (Bolkcom, 2004, p.4).  These statements suggest 
removing the pilot from the aircraft decreases the operator’s capability to understand the 
environment in which the aircraft operates.   
Few will debate unmanned aircraft systems bring about not only new technology 
but also a psychological shift and a new approach to operating aircraft in the skies.  
While crashing an aircraft, manned or unmanned, results in financial loss to stakeholders, 
removing the physical risk to the operator is a benefit of unmanned technology. Crashing 
or ditching an aircraft, typically the last resort in normal operations, now may serve as a 
primary mission function by design. 
A common nineteenth-century proverb, “better safe than sorry” exists as the 
foundation of aviation rulemaking and safety procedures. Beyond that, it describes a 
culture in which aviators make decisions based on calculated risks and what they believe 
to be the safest outcome given a specific situation.  Any rejection or contradiction of the 
“better safe than sorry” mindset warrants review.  Chuck Yeager learned from the feel of 
his aircraft and for more than half a century teams of flight test engineers put their lives at 
stake to help the industry further understand the limitations of flight.  Taking human lives 
out of the cockpit decreases personal risk.  However, continuing to the improve the safety 
of unmanned aircraft operations relies on an increased understanding of physiological 
and psychological impacts of removing the operator. 
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Statement of Problem 
Unmanned aircraft operator training varies widely due to the numerous types of 
aircraft that exist for a wide variety of missions.  Over time, newly developed training 
standards and safety initiatives will fit the form and function of the desired operations, 
whether it be precision agriculture or high-altitude reconnaissance.  However, the main 
benefit of Unmanned Aircraft may prove to be the biggest challenge when approaching 
safe and efficient operations.  The teleoperation of the aircraft from distant locations 
allows operators to conduct dull, dirty, or dangerous missions from the relative comfort 
of their ground control station (GCS).   Taking the human out of the cockpit minimizes 
many risks to the operator, most importantly loss of life.  Recognition and 
acknowledgment of psychological and physiological issues related to UAS operation will 
assist in developing adequate training and creating an environment that fosters the growth 
of efficient and safe organizations.   
Purpose of Study 
 The purpose of this study is to differentiate the meaning of safety and application 
thereof in manned and unmanned operations. This study also attempts to examine the 
impact perception of risk has on operational and organizational safety. 
Significance of Study 
 Unmanned Aircraft usher in a new era in the modern world.  UAS represents an 
entirely new market that will improve and increase the current aviation industry but will 
also break barriers into other market segments.  Soon, civilian and military UAS 
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operations will be carried out within the National Airspace System (NAS) in close 
coordination with other manned aircraft missions.  The confined nature and complexity 
of the NAS increases the importance of understanding how the introduction of UAS 
influences the status quo.  Rising popularity of UAS across a broad spectrum of 
industries and hobbyists alludes to increased congestion in the already complex airspace.  
That is in addition to the remote aircraft operations at any of the Academy of Model 
Aeronautics’ flying clubs that number over 2,500 (Gettinger & Michel, 2015).  Near 
Midair Collision (NMAC) reports concerning UA increased exponentially over the last 
decade. In a report published by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), pilots 
reported 1,346 potential unmanned aircraft sightings between August 2014 and January 
2016 (FAA, 2016).  NMAC data and the increasing popularity of civilian UAS further 
exemplifies the necessity to understand as much as we can about how to operate this new 
technology safely.   
 Manned aviators and unmanned operators face many similar situations and are 
forced to make decisions based on their best interpretation of the available information.  
They operate with many of the same limitations and under the similar fundamentals.  
However, what changes when the operator or pilot no longer resides with their aircraft?  
This study, limited in scope, attempts to expose areas in which aeronautical 
decision making differs between manned and unmanned aviators.  It will attempt this by 
looking at how pilots and operators perceive risk, how their organizations approach 
safety, and how they approach operational safety aspects.  Findings may provide essential 
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information as to how UAS and manned aviation are similar and, perhaps more 
importantly, where the two differ.   
Research Questions 
 The following is a list of primary and secondary questions to be examined:  
1. How does the perspective of safety differ between the manned and unmanned 
aviation industries? 
a. How do organizational safety practices or ideologies compare between 
manned and unmanned aviation? 
b. How do operational safety practices or ideologies compare between 
manned and unmanned aviation? 
2. Does the potential for loss of life, or the lack thereof, affect the pilot or operator’s 
perception of risk? 
a. How does risk perception alter decision making in routine operations? 
b. How does risk perception alter decision making in emergency operations? 
3. Is there a noticeable difference in safety culture when comparing manned and 
unmanned organizations?  
Conceptual Framework 
 A survey will be used to collect data, assisting in answering the above research 
questions.  Distributed to a diverse population of aviation professionals the survey 
included aviators or operators with solely UAS, solely manned aviation, and mixed 
operations background.  The information collected will include necessary demographic 
6 
 
information as well as details of their career.  Again, diversifying the population will 
remain an essential factor for comparing data and identifying areas where increased focus 
on safety may be required.  
Assumptions 
1. Participants in this study are doing so on a volunteer basis. 
2. Information collected in the form of responses to survey items is factual to the 
best of the participants’ knowledge. 
3. Participants in this survey have received some professional training in either 
UAS or manned aviation or have received training in both.   
Limitations 
1. The diversity of the population may provide a multitude of responses in which too 
many outcomes exist. 
2. The background of the participants will vary widely and may decrease the 
applicability of the survey for some individuals.  
3. The survey will be limited to those participants who have received training in 
either UAS or manned aviation. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Nomenclature 
 An Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) is an aerial vehicle piloted from a remote 
location through teleoperation.  UAVs are also known as Remotely Operated Vehicles 
(ROV), Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV) and Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles (UAV).  In 
the case of the United States Air Force who dislikes the term vehicle refers to UAVs as 
Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA), drones, or merely Unmanned Aircraft (UA).  
Unmanned Aircraft (UA) or Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) shall be the primary 
references throughout this document. 
Development of Unmanned Aircraft 
 The expendability of unmanned aircraft dates back to the roots of aviation.  Early 
aviation pioneers, the likes of Felix du Temple, Alexander Mozhaiski, Octave Chanute, 
the Wright Brothers, and countless more revolutionaries utilized models and kites to test 
theories without risking injury or death (Anderson, 2004).  Shortly after the Wright 
Brothers achieved powered, controlled, and sustained flight, inventors began looking for 
ways to take the humans out of the operation.   In 1908, Elmer Sperry developed a 
navigational gyroscope for the Navy.  After the successful testing of his gyroscope in 
1911, Sperry adapted the technology to act as a stabilization system for aircraft (Spinetta, 
2011).  While unreliable, the United States Navy saw enough promise in the technology 
to offer Sperry a contract to “pack a Curtiss N-9 floatplane with dynamite” and the army 
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to contract fellow pioneer Charles Kettering to create their versions of unmanned aerial 
torpedoes (Newcome, 2004, Spinetta, 2011, p.3).  Simplistic and disposable in design, 
these primitive UAs performed one way, seek and destroy missions using only basic 
aeronautical navigation equipment. Throughout the 20th century, unmanned aircraft 
evolved from aerial torpedoes to remotely piloted target aircraft and eventually to 
sophisticated, multi-use tools, we recognize today.  The modern unmanned aircraft 
industry developed around equipment similar to the Predator, Global Hawk, Shadow, and 
Hunter systems. Technology advancements in early 21st century provide both commercial 
and military markets with advanced tools capable of taking on an ever-expanding role in 
society and remain expendable regarding human skin in the game. “Dull, dirty, and 
dangerous” became the tagline for the types of missions UA would perform 
(Blydenburgh, 1999, p.2).  From the sands of the Middle East in support of the United 
States and foreign militaries to pipeline management in North Dakota, unmanned aircraft 
perform tasks that remove pilots from harm’s way. While modern unmanned systems 
share little with Sperry’s Unmanned Curtiss N-9 floatplane, the absence of human-
machine physical connection is the same.  To continue the evolution of unmanned 
aircraft, understanding the effects of separating pilot from aircraft may prove essential is 
developing policy and doctrine moving forward.    
Economic Considerations 
In a report by market analyst firm Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited (DTTL) the 
total civilian UAS industry revenues were predicted to be between $200 million and $400 
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million (Canis, 2015).  Bill Canis, in a Congressional Research Service outlook forecast, 
adds that total revenue for 2015 including military, civil, and commercial may have 
reached as high as $3.3 billion (Canis, 2015).  The UAS market currently includes 
precision agriculture, infrastructure maintenance and management, aerial photography, 
law enforcement, disaster management, telecommunication, weather monitoring, and 
freight transport to name a few (Jenkins & Vasigh, 2013).  While solidifying the use of 
UAS in these markets is an essential step in developing a UAS industry, innovation, and 
creative UAS solutions will drive the industry to new heights.   
 The unmanned market presents an opportunity to add significantly to the 
economy.  In 2013, the Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International 
(AUVSI) released a report titled The Economic Impact of Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
Integration in the United States.  In this report Darryl Jenkins and Dr. Bijan Vasigh 
(2013) conclude “the economic impact of the integration of UAS into the NAS will total 
more than $13.6 billion in the first three years of integration and will grow sustainably for 
the foreseeable future, cumulating to more than $82.1 billion between 2015 and 2025” 
(p.2).  Direct and indirect job creation due to the introduction of UAS in the United States 
is forecasted to produce over 103 thousand new jobs (Jenkins and Vasigh, 2013).   
 Maximizing these benefits can only be accomplished by ensuring the industry 
grows.  Create safe operating environments and practices will help to increase public 
perception and acceptance of this tremendous economic opportunity.  
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Unmanned Safety & Current Regulation 
 Previous attempts to create preventative or reactive safety measures for unmanned 
aircraft has proven difficult due to a general lack of available data.  Much of the early UA 
operations in the 1990’s and early 2000’s existed in the form of Military operations.  As 
such, data regarding those operations is widely unavailable either for proprietary or 
security reasons. Kevin Williams also suggests that data is hard to obtain, in part, due to 
the low level of analysis on unmanned accidents and incidents.  He explains the 
decreased analytics is a result of the smaller financial loss to the military in comparison 
to the loss of a manned asset (Williams, 2004). The transition into the second decade of 
the 21st century brings with it the promise of expanded UA operations for both military 
and civilian industries.  Beyond accident data, even less data is available in the decision-
making processes that UAS operators utilize.  Assumptions that UAS operators and 
manned aviators make decisions and approach safety, in the same way, could prove 
detrimental to the industry.  Understanding how UAS operators perceive risk and 
approach safety will assist in shaping regulations and ensuring that unmanned specific 
safety concerns are, at a minimum, held in the same regard as those of manned aviators.  
Integration of Unmanned Systems into the National Airspace system exposes 
several safety concerns. Due to the rapid growth and popularity of UAS, the Federal 
Aviation Administration found themselves pressured to create regulations to ensure safe 
operation of UAS integration NAS.  Congress, by way of the FAA Modernization and 
Reform Act of 2012, pushed the FAA to create and implement UAS regulations. 
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Introduced in late 2016, Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Part 107 responded to 
Congress’ call and opened the NAS to small UAS platforms.  FAR part 107 addresses 
many UA operational concerns to include pilot certification and registration; however, it 
lacks in its impact on safety considerations.  Advisory circular AC 107-2 augments 14 
CFR part 107 by “promoting compliance” of the regulations and encourages remote 
pilots to “use this information [AC 107-2] as best practice methods for developing 
operational programs scaled to specific small unmanned aircraft” (FAA, 2016).   
While FAA part 107 represents a move towards integration of UAS into the NAS, 
further research and analysis must be done to ensure that this step in the right direction 
continues producing positive results. Analysis of UAS (drone) incident data by Dan 
Gettinger and Arthur Michel revealed several concerning statistics.  They found that 
“over 90 percent of all incidents occurred above 400 feet” and “within five miles of an 
airport” (Gettinger & Michel, 2015, p. executive summary).  Moreover, while this report 
preceded the release of FAA Part 107, it shows a violation of the AC 91-57A Model 
Aircraft Operating Standards, which shares similar altitude and weight restrictions with 
the FAA’s regulations.   
Understanding causes of UAS incidents and accidents pave the way to a more 
productive and efficient industry.  Are UAS operators receiving appropriate training?  
How do UAS operators view flying?  What level of severity do they apply to potential 
incidents?   
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Current Safety Initiatives Aviation Safety Programs 
 Reviewing current safety initiatives and programs is essential in further 
understanding how to approach specific unmanned aviation safety protocols.  
Risk Perception 
 Perceiving risks in a given scenario affects decision-making.  Torbjorn Rundmo 
discusses the matter of risk perception as a difference between objective and subjective 
perception.  Rundmo states, “employees’ perception of risk as well as their subjective 
assessments of the working conditions and work environment can be important for the 
personnel’s behavior with regards to risk and hence may also influence objective risk or 
safety” (Rundmo, 1996, p.197).  Consequences should play a role in risk perception and 
estimation.  In regards to pilots’ perception of flight, David Hunter found that “pilots 
substantially underestimated the risk of general aviation flying relative to other activities” 
and additionally states, “the viewer [participant] must, therefore, perceive accurately not 
only the external situation but also their personal capacities. (Hunter, 2002, p.3).  
Together risk perception and personal capacities should be taken into account when 
making decisions.  Rundmo suggests that risk perception is tied directly to their risk 
behavior.  
 Perception of risk in aviation, as it is in many facets of life, directly influences the 
decision-making process and is ultimately affected by several factors.  Rundmo suggests 
that our “biased perception of risk can cause misjudgments of potentially hazardous risk 
sources” (Rundmo, 1996, p.198).  Personal experience, background, education, and 
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several other factors shape opinions of classifying high and low-risk activities.  For 
example, pilots with minimal IFR training may view flight in IMC conditions as more 
hazardous that pilots with years of experience.  Similarly, a UAS operator with little 
experience in a particular situation may deem a flight high-risk when an operator more 
familiar with the locale would not.  In both examples, the equipment, flight path, weather, 
mission, and flight plan could all be the same.  However, the outcome of the operation 
might drastically change due to the decision making of the pilot (operator) based on their 
perception of risk in the given operation.  Understanding these variables can be extremely 
difficult.  Orasanu, Fischer, and Davison (2002) point out that incorrect interpretation of 
important cues contributes to the inappropriate assessment of risk, failing to update one’s 
situation model. Orasanu, Fischer, and Davison continue to explain how, “perception of 
risks and the decisions that follow are influenced both by individual cognitive factors, as 
well as by organizational pressures relating to company productivity, economics, and its 
safety culture” (p.2).  
 Application of studying risk perception in UAS operations may be complicated, 
but this study aims to depict why it deserves attention.  Aviators occupying the cockpit of 
a cargo airliner must perform on schedule and operate at peak efficiency while 
maintaining a high standard of safety.  If weather moves into the departure airport, the 
pilot must decide to go or not.  Decision making may get more complicated if he has a 
family at home waiting for him.  That external pressure, to arrive home, may be enough 
for the pilot to outweigh the inclement weather and take off in a perceived risky situation.  
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Alternatively, the external pressures, both professional and personal, were enough to 
lower the pilot’s perception of the risk.  Would a UAS operator given the same situation 
make the same decision?  What external pressures drive risk perception in UAS 
operations?  If the operator gets to go home for Christmas regardless of the outcome of 
the flight, would they make a more informed decision with less influence from personal 
pressures? Or would the company’s goals and the perceived lower risk due to no threat to 
life outweigh the weather situation?  The easy answer is that regulation and policy would 
dictate the decision.  Does the company policy and FAA allow for flight in this situation?  
Well this study, as with previous risk perception studies, attempts to analyze the gray 
area.  What drives decision making when no one is watching?  
Risk Tolerance 
 “Anything is safe if its risks are judged to be acceptable (Gill, 2004, p.44).  David 
Hunter defines risk tolerance as “the amount of risk that an individual is willing to accept 
in the pursuit of some goal” (Hunter, 2002, p.3).  Applying this sentiment to aviation, risk 
tolerance plays into how pilots make decisions.  Hunter concluded, “Perception of risk is 
negatively related to tolerance for risk” (Hunter, 2002, p.20).  In UAS operations, an 
operator’s risk is minimal.  Determining how an operator tolerates or judges risk may 
help to predict the safety of a given operation.  It is interesting to consider the idea that a 
pilot may tolerate less risk in a given scenario where a UAS operator with no personal 
risk to life, may tolerate a much higher risk.  Hunter’s study suggests age, profession, and 
other factors influence the amount of risk tolerance in an individual.  
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Summary of Literature Review 
 Disposable by nature, unmanned aircraft present opportunities to explore areas 
that would previously place pilots in harm’s way.  This review of the available literature 
exposes a lack of studies examining connections between risk perceptions and self-
preservation.  Links exist between various parallel industry studies such as Rundmo’s 
study of oilrig employees in Norway.  Analyzing available accident/incident data 
provides a broader picture of the UAS industry safety outlook.  Current data is limited; 
however, this review of literature included information from a few of the available 
studies and concluded that human factors are present in a high percent of UAS mishaps.  
While cockpit design, haptic feedback, and other physical human factor concerns are 
more frequently studied, UAS operator’s perception and tolerance of risk are generally 
under-analyzed.  This study will attempt to explore differences that exist when the fate of 
the pilot is not tied to that of their aircraft.  
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CHAPTER III 
METHOD 
 Unmanned technology and automation further perpetuate the different human 
factors facing UAS operators.  This study explores the relationship of several key 
attributes of UA operations and how they affect the decision making and safety 
perception of the crew.  The literature review did not include a study that focused on 
these issues and as such leaves potential gaps in training and doctrine that may lead to 
new dangerous attitudes if left unchecked.  This study utilizes a survey designed to 
expose different perceptions of safety when comparing the manned and unmanned 
aviation industries.   
Population 
 The participants in this study will be asked to self-identify as either a military 
UAS operator, Civilian UAS operator, Commercial Pilot, general aviation pilot, hobbyist 
UA operator, or other, ensuring inclusion of a significant portion of professional and 
general aviators.  After self-identifying, questions will be designed to reveal the level of 
experience the participant has in both UAS and manned aviation.  This population could 
pose challenging to study due to the mixed bias of a participant with experience in both 
UAS and manned aviation.  For example, United States military UA operators present 
diverse backgrounds.  United States Army operators are typically young, enlisted soldiers 
with minimal flight experience whereas United States Navy operators undergo significant 
manned flight training before unmanned operations.  Diversifying the participant 
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population will increase the scale of the survey but may lead to specific areas in which to 
conduct further research. 
Data Collection 
 This survey, produced and distributed using Qualtrics®, a web-based survey tool, 
was distributed through electronic means.  Participants first provided demographic data 
used to identify various groups within the overall population and to establish a baseline 
for data analysis upon completion of the survey.  The author of this study has an 
undergraduate degree in Unmanned Aircraft Systems Operations and currently works for 
a leader in the UAS industry. The author used this knowledge to develop twenty-nine 
survey items designed to address the three research questions.  
Sample 
 This study aimed to target no less than 100 individuals in an attempt to diversify 
the demographics of the participants while maintaining the applicability of the results.  
An equilibrium among demographics would further increase the stability of resulting 
data.   
Demographics 
 Distribution of the survey via electronic methods increased the opportunity for 
participants in multiple regions and professions to take part in the study.  This research 
targets both manned and unmanned aviators.  Participants provided categorical 
information about themselves to include age, sex, profession, experience in aviation, and 
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experience in unmanned aviation.  This information allowed for a better understanding of 
the study population. 
Validation and Reliability 
 Validation of the survey occurred through a series pilot surveys to eliminate 
systematic or contextual confusions.  After the pilot surveys, careful consideration was 
given to feedback and if deemed applicable, altered specific aspects of the original 
survey. 
 Only data from participants that completed the entire survey was to the final 
analysis.  
Proposed Data Analysis 
 Data collected from the survey was processed using IBM SPSS® Statistics 
Software.  Information from each demographic may correlate with different approaches 
to risk assessment.  Descriptive data and significance testing provided sufficient data to 
use in the discussion. 
Protection of Participants 
 All data provided from survey participants were cleared of any personally 
identifiable information.  These measures were integral for promoting complete and  
honest responses from survey participants.  
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
Demographics 
 There were eighty-seven (of eighty-nine) responses received during the collection 
period which met the completion threshold.  Therefore the two incomplete responses 
were discarded.   
Unmanned v. Manned 
 The population consisted of two major 
subgroups.  Of the eighty-seven complete 
responses twenty-seven (31.0 percent) identified 
as UAS focused and the remaining sixty (69.0 
percent) identified as traditionally manned 
aviators (Figure 1). 
Age 
 Age was reported by eighty-two participants of the total population.  Of those 
eighty-two, twenty-five belonged to the group of unmanned participants, and fifty-seven 
belonged to the manned pilot population.  The ages were broken down into categories, 
and participants’ responses were recorded into their respective group.  Those categories 
being eighteen to twenty-four, twenty-five to thirty-four, thirty-six to forty-four, and 
forty-five and older.  The majority of unmanned participants, forty percent, fell in the 
27
60
Unmanned Manned
Figure 1 Unmanned v. Manned Participants. 
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twenty-five to thirty-four age group whereas the majority of manned pilots, eighty-one 
percent fell into the eighteen to twenty-four age group (Table 1). 
 
Gender 
 Of the total population seventy-eight (89.7 percent), were male and nine (10.3 
percent) reported as female.  The UAS population reported twenty-six (96.3 percent) 
male and one (3.7 percent) female.  Manned aviation reported fifty-two (86.7 percent) 
male and 8 (13.3 percent) female (Table 2.).  
Table 2. Gender of Participants. 
Variable Unmanned Manned Total 
What is your gender? Male 26  52  78  
Female 1  8  9  
Table 1. Age of Participants. 
Variable Unmanned Manned Total 
What is your age? 18-24 6  46 52  
25-34 10  4  14  
36-44 7  7  14  
45+ 2  0 2  
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Level of Education 
 Twenty-six unmanned and fifty-nine manned participants provided their level of 
education.  The majority of UAS participants, eleven (42.3 percent), possessed a four-
year college degree.  In comparison, the majority of manned participants, thirty-nine (66 
percent), indicated they had received some level of college education (Table 3).   
Table 3. Level of Education 
     Variable Unmanned Manned Total 
What is your highest 
level of education? 
High school graduate 2  7  9 
Some college 3  39 
 
42 
two-year degree 1  2  3 
four-year degree 11 
 
6  17 
Professional degree 9  4  13 
Doctorate 0 1  1 
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Military Service 
 Of the eighty-seven participants, fifteen (17.2 percent) indicated they currently 
serve, or previously served as a member of the United States Military. Nine (60.0 
percent) of those participants were UAS, 
and six (40.0 percent) were from the 
manned population (Table 4).  The most 
populous group, five (55.0 percent), of 
the unmanned participants connected to 
the Military, served in the United States 
Army while the largest group, three (50.0 
percent), of all manned participants, 
served in the United States Marines (Figure 2).  
Table 4. Participants with Current or Former Military Service. 
Variable Unmanned Manned Total 
Have you 
served in the 
U.S Military? 
Yes 9  6  15 
No 18  55  72 
 
Manned Pilot Experience 
Manned aviation experience was reported by twenty-two of twenty-seven (81.5 
percent) UAS respondents.  They possessed two student pilot certificates, seven private 
pilot certificates, and thirteen commercial pilot certificates.  Of those, four indicated that 
Figure 2. Participant’s military service by branch. 
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they were Certified Flight Instructors. Twenty respondents provided estimated hours 
operating manned aircraft.  The most extensive group (n=13) of UAS operators reported 
having between one hundred one and five hundred flight hours, with two operators 
indicating experience of greater than two-thousand hours.  
 In comparison, two manned aviators held no certificates, eight held student pilot 
certificates, twenty-seven held private pilot certificates, twenty held commercial pilot 
certificates, and four held Airline Transport Pilot certificates.  About half of the manned 
aviation respondents had less than 100 hours total time, with four reporting greater than 
two-thousand hours (Table 5).   
Table 5. Hours Piloting Manned Aircraft (UAS & Manned). 
Variable Unmanned Manned Total 
Indicate number of 
hours piloting 
manned aircraft. 
Less than 100 3 28 31 
101-500 13 24 37 
501-1000 2 4 6 
1001-2000 0 1 1 
Greater than 2000 2 4 6 
 
Unmanned Aircraft Operating Experience 
 Unmanned aircraft operating experience was reported by twenty-six unmanned, 
and twenty-five manned respondents reported having some experience operating 
unmanned aircraft systems.  
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Experience among unmanned participants varied with nine (34.6 percent) 
indicating less than one hundred hours of operating experience and six (23.1 percent) 
reporting having greater than two thousand hours of operating experience (Figure 3).  
When asked to identify their current occupation as it relates to UAS operations the top 
three selections were program management (n=7), commercial operations (n=5), and 
hobbyist (n=5) (Table 6).  
Over ninety percent of manned participants with some level of UAS experience 
indicated having less than one hundred hours of experience.  The remaining participants 
indicated their operating time between one hundred one and five hundred hours (Figure 
3).  A majority of the thirty-five manned aviators with occupations related to UAS, sixty-
six percent (n=23), designated their operations as only hobbyist level (Table 6).  
Table 6. Current Occupation as it Relates to UAS. 
Variable Unmanned Manned Total 
 Hobbyist 5 23 28 
Commercial Operator 5 7 12 
Military 2 1 3 
Program Management 7 0 7 
Engineering 1 0 1 
Other 6 4 10 
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Figure 3. Hours Operating Unmanned Aircraft (UAS & Manned) 
Survey Data Analysis 
 As stated above, eighty-nine responses were collected using Qualtrics Survey 
tool. However, two responses were omitted from the data analysis due to incomplete 
answers.  Analysis of the data with and without the two omitted responses showed that 
they did not affect the significance of the study.   
The following analysis breaks down the survey items into three sections.  These 
sections correspond to the research questions presented in chapter one of this study.  
Cronbach’s Alphas 
Each section was tested for reliability and consistency of responses.  The safety 
perception subscale consisted of nine items with an α=.48, below the acceptable value of 
.70.  Further testing in SPSS revealed no change to the Cronbach’s Alpha by removing 
any individual item.  The risk perception subscale consisted of nine items with an α=.88 
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meeting the required level of reliability.  The organization safety culture subscale 
consisted of eleven items with an α=.82 meeting the required level of reliability.  
Method of Analysis 
Collected responses for each research questions were analyzed in two ways. The 
first method looked at the entire data set as one result, indicating each participant’s mean 
rating for the section. The second method analyzed each variable. Both methods 
compared the groups “manned” and unmanned.” 
Research Question 1: How does the perspective of safety differ between the manned 
and unmanned aviation industries? 
Descriptive 
 The participants’ perception of safety was evaluated based on their responses to 
nine survey items.  Each of these items was presented in Likert type statements in which 
the participant selected to which degree they either agreed or disagreed with the 
statements.  
Items identified as “5.X” ranged from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree.” 
“agree,” “neutral,” and “disagree,” made up the three middle selections. Items identified 
as “6.X” ranged from “always” to “never.” “Most of the time,” “about half the time,” and 
“sometimes,” completed middle selections. A “not applicable” option was available for 
participants.  When selected, “not applicable” options were treated as missing responses.  
Survey items for the first research question had an average 91.2 percent response rate 
(Table 7).  
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Table 7. Research question one survey details. 
Survey Item 
Identifier Response Rate Survey Item Detail 
5.5 97.7 percent Your organization provides adequate training for 
emergency situations to all parties involved in flight 
operations. 
5.6 97.7 percent Your training included specific instruction on 
recognizing adverse meteorological or atmospheric 
conditions. 
5.8 96.6 percent As a PIC, you maintain a sterile cockpit, limiting 
non-essential communication, during critical phases 
of flight. 
6.1 96.6 percent The pilot or operator in command always conducts a 
walk around. 
6.3 78.2 percent Intentionally crashing an aircraft to ensure the flight 
objective is met is acceptable. 
6.4 98.9 percent Cutting corners in regards to SOPs is acceptable if it 
will help you meet your mission objectives faster as 
long as there is no blatant disregard for safety. 
6.6 98.9 percent As the PIC, you feel personally responsible for the 
outcome of the flight. 
6.7 94.3 percent During prolonged or extended flight operations, you 
find it difficult to maintain complete concentration 
on the task at hand. 
6.8 62.1 percent When a flight operation extends beyond a single 
PIC’s duty period, the incoming crew is always 
provided with a detailed brief on the current status of 
the operation, including aircraft configuration/status 
and any noteworthy flight events. 
 
 
Method One – Survey Items Combined with Mean Score 
 Items 6.3, 6.4, and 6.8 were re-coded to reverse their responses to create a 
standardized set of data. After the re-coding, low scores represented high safety 
perception or awareness, and high scores represented low safety perception or awareness.   
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After creating a uniform scale, a Mean Safety Perception Rating (MSPR) was 
calculated for each participant using the compute variable function of SPSS.  
Normality Testing 
The MSPR was tested for normality (Figure 4).  Based on the histogram depicting 
sizeable positive skewness, it was determined that the MSPR results were not normally 
distributed.  A reciprocal (1/X) transformation was used to reduce the skewness and bring 
the results closer to normality.  The resulting histogram showed relatively normal 
distributions (Figure 5).  
 
 
 
Figure 4. MSPR without transformation. Figure 5. MSPR after Reciprocal 
Transformation 
One Way Analysis of Variance 
 Having achieved a more acceptable level of normality after the reciprocal 
transformation, a one-way ANOVA was conducted for the MSPR.  The main effect of 
whether participants identified as unmanned or manned was not significant at the p<.05 
level [F (1,86) =.854, p=.358].  Perception of safety did not differ between manned (M = 
.67, SD = .15) and unmanned (M = .70, SD = .18) groups.  
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Method Two – Individual Variable Analysis 
 The second method of data analysis did not correct for normality; instead, non-
parametric testing was used to assess relationships.  Each of the 9 survey items was 
analyzed individually with general descriptive statistics followed by the Mann-Whitney 
independent samples test.    
5.5  Your organization provides adequate training for emergency 
situations to all parties involved in flight operations. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Responses to the statement “your organization provides adequate training for 
emergency situations to all parties involved in flight operations” were received from 
twenty-six (96.2 percent) unmanned participants and fifty-nine (98.3 percent) manned 
participants.  Both groups, unmanned (M = 1.58, SD 1.07) and manned (M = 1.49, SD = 
.858), largely agreed with the statement; indicating a high level of safety perception 
(Figures 6 and 7). 
  
Figure 6. Histogram of 5.5 Unmanned. Figure 7. Histogram of 5.5 Manned. 
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Mann-Whitney U Test 
 A Mann-Whitney U Test concluded that both UAS and Manned respondents 
selected “low risk” answers and no statistically significant differences existed between 
groups (U = 755, P = .89).  Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
5.6  Your training included specific instruction on recognizing adverse 
meteorological or atmospheric conditions. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Responses to the statement “your training included specific instruction on 
recognizing adverse meteorological or atmospheric conditions” were received from 
twenty-six (96.2 percent) of the unmanned participants and fifty-nine (98.3 percent) of 
the manned participants.  Both groups, unmanned (M = 1.46, SD .761) and manned (M = 
1.37, SD = .667), largely agreed with the statement; indicating a high level of safety 
perception (Figures 8 and 9). 
  
  
 
  
Figure 8. Histogram of 5.6 Unmanned Figure 9. Histogram of 5.6 Manned 
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Mann-Whitney U Test 
 A Mann-Whitney U Test concluded that both UAS and Manned respondents 
selected “low risk” answers and no statistically significant differences existed between 
groups (U = 722.50, P = .60).  Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
5.8 As a PIC, you maintain a sterile cockpit, limiting non-essential 
communication, during critical phases of flight. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Responses to the statement “as a PIC, you maintain a sterile cockpit, limiting non-
essential communication, during critical phases of flight” were received from twenty-four 
(88.9 percent) of the unmanned participants and sixty (100.0 percent) of the manned 
participants.  Both groups, unmanned (M = 1.38, SD = .77) and manned (M = 1.52, SD = 
.65), largely agreed with the statement; indicating a high level of safety perception 
(Figures 10 and 11).  
 
  
Figure 10. Histogram of 5.8 Unmanned. Figure 11. Histogram of 5.8 Manned 
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Mann-Whitney U Test 
 A Mann-Whitney U Test concluded that both UAS and Manned respondents 
selected “low risk” answers.  UAS respondents had a slightly lower mean rank (37.27) in 
comparison to the mean rank of the manned participants (44.59). However, no 
statistically significant differences existed between groups (U = 594.50, P = .15).  
Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected based on this statement. 
6.1 The pilot or operator in command always conducts a walk around. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Responses to the statement “the pilot or operator in command always conducts a 
walk around” were collected from twenty-six (96.2 percent) of the unmanned participants 
and fifty-eight (96.7 percent) of the manned participants.  Both groups, unmanned (M = 
1.08, SD = .272) and manned (M = 1.17, SD = .50), largely agreed with the statement; 
indicating a high level of safety perception (Figures 12 and 13). 
 
 
  
Figure 12. Histogram of 6.1 Unmanned. Figure 13. Histogram of 6.1 Manned 
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Mann-Whitney U Test 
 A Mann-Whitney U Test concluded that both UAS and Manned respondents 
selected “low risk” answers and no statistically significant differences existed between 
groups (U = 718.00, P = .516).  Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected based 
on this statement. 
6.3 Intentionally crashing an aircraft to ensure the flight objective is met 
is acceptable. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Responses to the statement “intentionally crashing an aircraft to ensure the flight 
objective is met is acceptable” were collected from twenty (74.1 percent) of the 
unmanned participants and forty-eight (80.0 percent) of the manned participants.  Both 
groups, unmanned (M = 1.65, SD = 1.09) and manned (M = 1.67, SD = 1.36), largely 
agreed with the statement; indicating a high level of safety perception (Figures 14 and 
15). 
    
 
 
 
Figure 14. Histogram of 6.3 Unmanned. Figure 15. Histogram of 6.3 Manned. 
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Mann-Whitney U Test 
 A Mann-Whitney U Test concluded that both UAS and Manned respondents 
selected “low risk” answers and no statistically significant differences existed between 
groups (U = 422.50, P = .33).  Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected based on 
this statement. 
6.4 Cutting corners in regards to SOPs is acceptable if it will help you 
meet your mission objectives faster as long as there is no blatant disregard 
for safety. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Responses to the statement “cutting corners in regards to SOPs is acceptable if it 
will help you meet your mission objectives faster as long as there is no blatant disregard 
for safety” were collected from twenty-six (96.2 percent) of the unmanned participants 
and sixty (100.0 percent) of the manned participants.  Both groups, unmanned (M = 1.65, 
SD = 1.23) and manned (M = 1.82, SD = 1.14), largely agreed with the statement; 
indicating a high level of safety perception (Figures 16 and 17). 
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Figure 16. Histogram of 6.4 Unmanned. Figure 17. Histogram of 6.4 Manned 
   
Mann-Whitney U Test 
 A Mann-Whitney U Test concluded that both UAS and Manned respondents 
selected “low risk” answers and no statistically significant differences existed between 
groups (U = 664.00, P = .22).  Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected based on 
this statement. 
6.6 As the PIC, you feel personally responsible for the outcome of the 
flight. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Responses to the statement “as the PIC; you feel personally responsible for the 
outcome of the flight” were collected from twenty-six (96.2 percent) of the unmanned 
participants and sixty (100.0 percent) of the manned participants.  Both groups, 
unmanned (M = 1.12, SD = .33) and manned (M = 1.18, SD = .43), largely agreed with 
the statement; indicating a high level of safety perception (Figures 18 and 19). 
 
   
  
Figure 18. Histogram of 6.6 Unmanned. Figure 19. Histogram of 6.6 Manned. 
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Mann-Whitney U Test 
 A Mann-Whitney U Test concluded that both UAS and Manned respondents 
selected “low risk” answers and no statistically significant differences existed between 
groups (U =738.50, P = .53).  Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected based on 
this statement. 
6.7 During long or extended flight operations, you find it difficult to 
maintain complete concentration on the task at hand. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Responses to the statement “during long or extended flight operations, you find it 
difficult to maintain complete concentration on the task at hand” were collected from 
twenty-four (88.9 percent) of the unmanned participants and Fifty-eight (96.7 percent) of 
the manned participants.  Both groups, unmanned (M = 2.25, SD = .85) and manned (M 
= 2.31, SD = .96), largely agreed with the statement; indicating a high level of safety 
perception (Figures 20 and 21).   
  
Figure 20. Histogram of 6.7 Unmanned. Figure 21. Histogram of 6.7 Manned. 
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Mann-Whitney U Test 
 A Mann-Whitney U Test concluded that both UAS and Manned respondents 
selected “low risk” answers and no statistically significant differences existed between 
groups (U =678.00, P = .84). Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected based on 
this statement. 
6.8 When a flight operation extends beyond a single PIC’s duty period, 
the incoming crew is always provided with a detailed brief on the current 
status of the operation, including aircraft configuration/status and any 
noteworthy flight events. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Responses to the statement “when a flight operation extends beyond a single 
PIC’s duty period, the incoming crew is always provided with a detailed brief on the 
current status of the operation, including aircraft configuration/status and any noteworthy 
flight events” were collected from twenty-one (77.8 percent) of the unmanned 
participants and Thirty-three (55.0 percent) of the manned participants.  Both groups, 
unmanned (M = 1.38, SD = .50) and manned (M = 1.98, SD = 1.31), largely agreed with 
the statement; indicating a high level of safety perception (Figures 22 and 23).  
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Figure 22. Histogram of 6.8 Unmanned. Figure 23. Histogram of 6.8 Manned. 
 
Mann-Whitney U Test 
 A Mann-Whitney U Test concluded that both UAS and Manned respondents 
selected “low risk” answers and no statistically significant differences existed between 
groups (U =285.00, P = .22).  Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected based on 
this statement. 
Research Question 2: Does the potential for loss of life, or the lack thereof, affect the 
pilot or operator’s perception of risk? 
Descriptive 
 The participant’s perception of risk was evaluated based on the following nine 
survey items.  Each of these items was presented in ordinal rank statements asked the 
participant to rate risk in a given scenario. Participant’s answers ranged from no risk (0) 
to severe risk (10).  Survey items for the first research question had an average 90.9 
percent response rate (Table 8).  
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Table 8. Research question two survey details. 
Survey Item 
Identifier Response Rate Survey Item 
4.1 96.6 percent Please rate the risk involved with a complete 
engine failure. (0-10) 
4.2 90.8 percent Please rate the risk involved with a complete 
engine failure on take-off or launch. (0-10) 
4.3 85.1 percent Please rate the risk involved with a complete 
electrical failure during flight operations. (0-10) 
4.4 88.5 percent Please rate the risk involved with an engine (or 
motor) fire during flight operations.  (0-10) 
4.5 88.5 percent Please rate the risk involved with inadvertent 
flight into inclement weather. (0-10) 
4.6 93.1 percent Please rate the risk involved with losing radio 
communication with Air Traffic Control. (0-10) 
4.7 95.4 percent Please rate the risk involved with mid-air 
collisions. (0-10) 
4.8 88.5 percent Please rat the risk involved with flight in 
moderate or higher turbulence. (0-10) 
4.9 92.0 percent Please rate the risk involved with losing primary 
navigation systems (GPS, FMS, VOR, etc.) (0-
10) 
 
Method One – Survey Items Combined into Mean Score 
 No re-coding was necessary for data pertaining to research question two.  All 
scores ranged from low to severe risk (0-10).  The mean score for risk perception was 
found using the compute variable tool in SPSS and was used for statistical testing in 
method one. This provided a Mean Risk Perception Score (MRPS) for each participant.   
Normality Testing 
The MRPS was tested for normality (Figure 24).  Based on the histogram 
depicting positive skewness, it was determined that the MRPS results were not normally 
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distributed.  A logarithmic (log10) transformation was used to reduce the skewness and 
bring the results closer to normality.  The resulting histogram showed relatively normal 
distributions (Figure 25).  
  
Figure 24. MRPS without transformation. Figure 25. MPRS with Log10 
Transformation. 
One Way Analysis of Variance 
 Having achieved a more acceptable level of normality after the reciprocal 
transformation, a one-way ANOVA was conducted for the MRPS.  The main effect of 
whether participants identified as unmanned or manned was not significant, [F (1,86) 
=.428, p=.515].  Perception of risk did not differ between manned (M = .52, SD = .25) 
and unmanned (M = .55, SD = .19) groups.  
Method Two – Individual Variable Analysis 
 The second method of data analysis did not correct for normality; rather it utilized 
non-parametric testing to assess relationships.  Each of the 9 survey items was analyzed 
individually with general descriptive statistics followed by the Mann-Whitney 
independent samples test.    
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4.1 Please rate the risk involved with a complete engine failure. (0-10) 
Descriptive Statistics 
Responses to the statement “please rate the risk involved with a complete engine 
failure” were collected from twenty-six (96.2 percent) of the unmanned participants and 
fifty-eight (96.7 percent) of the manned participants.  Both groups, unmanned (M = 2.62, 
SD = 1.94) and manned (M = 3.45, SD = 2.58), indicated a low to moderate level of risk 
(Figures 26 and 27). 
  
Figure 26. Histogram of 4.1 Unmanned. Figure 27. Histogram of 4.1 Manned. 
Mann-Whitney U Test 
 A Mann-Whitney U Test concluded that both UAS and Manned respondents 
indicated low risk given the scenario. However, no statistically significant differences 
existed between groups (U =660.00, P = .36).  Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected based on this statement. 
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4.2 Please rate the risk involved with a complete engine failure on take-off 
or launch. (0-10) 
Descriptive Statistics 
Responses to the statement “please rate the risk involved with a complete engine 
failure on take-off or launch” were collected from twenty-three (85.2 percent) of the 
unmanned participants and fifty-six (93.3 percent) of the manned participants.  Both 
groups, unmanned (M = 2.26, SD = 2.68) and manned (M = 3.09, SD = 2.89), indicated a 
low to moderate level of risk (Figures 28 and 29).        
  
Figure 28. Histogram of 4.2 Unmanned. Figure 29. Histogram of 4.2 Manned. 
 
Mann-Whitney U Test 
 A Mann-Whitney U Test concluded that both UAS and Manned respondents 
indicated low risk given the scenario. However, no statistically significant differences 
existed between groups (U =513.50, P = .15).  Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected based on this statement. 
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4.3   Please rate the risk involved with a complete electrical failure during 
flight operations. (0-10) 
Descriptive Statistics 
Responses to the statement “please rate the risk involved with a complete 
electrical failure during flight operations” were collected from twenty-two (81.5 percent) 
of the unmanned participants and fifty-two (86.7 percent) of the manned participants.  
Both groups, unmanned (M = 2.82, SD = 2.61) and manned (M = 4.00, SD = 2.77), 
indicated a low to moderate level of risk (Figures 30 and 31).       
  
Figure 30. Histogram of 4.3 Unmanned. Figure 31. Histogram of 4.3 Manned. 
 
Mann-Whitney U Test 
 A Mann-Whitney U Test concluded that both UAS and Manned respondents 
indicated low to medium risk given the scenario, however, no statistically significant 
differences existed between groups (U =436.00, P = .10).  Therefore, the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected based on this statement. 
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4.4 Please rate the risk involved with an engine (or motor) fire during 
flight operations.  (0-10) 
Descriptive Statistics 
Responses to the statement “please rate the risk involved with an engine (or 
motor) fire during flight operations” were collected from twenty-two (81.5 percent) of the 
unmanned participants and fifty-five (91.7 percent) of the manned participants.  Both 
groups, unmanned (M = 2.32, SD = 2.57) and manned (M = 2.25, SD = 2.79), indicated a 
low to moderate level of risk (Figures 22 and 23).   
  
Figure 32. Histogram of 4.4 Unmanned. Figure 33. Histogram of 4.4 Manned. 
 
Mann-Whitney U Test 
 A Mann-Whitney U Test concluded that both UAS and Manned respondents 
indicated low risk given the scenario. However, no statistically significant differences 
exist between groups (U =580.50, P = .78).  Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected based on this statement. 
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4.5 Please rate the risk involved with inadvertent flight into inclement 
weather. (0-10) 
Descriptive Statistics 
Responses to the statement “please rate the risk involved with inadvertent flight 
into inclement weather” were collected from twenty-three (85.2 percent) of the unmanned 
participants and fifty-four (90.0 percent) of the manned participants.  Both groups, 
unmanned (M = 5.13, SD = 2.75) and manned (M = 3.41, SD = 2.27), indicated a 
moderate level of risk (Figures 34 and 35).           
  
Figure 34. Histogram of 4.5 Unmanned. Figure 35. Histogram of 4.5 Manned. 
 
Mann-Whitney U Test 
 A Mann-Whitney U Test concluded that statistically significant differences exist 
between groups (U =401.00, P = .01).  
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4.6 Please rate the risk involved with losing radio communication with 
Air Traffic Control. (0-10) 
Descriptive Statistics 
Responses to the statement “please rate the risk involved with losing radio 
communication with Air Traffic Control” were collected from twenty-six (96.3 percent) 
of the unmanned participants and fifty-five (91.7 percent) of the manned participants.   
Both groups, unmanned (M = 5.69, SD = 2.59) and manned (M = 5.31, SD = 2.12), 
indicated a moderate level of risk (Figures 36 and 37).  
  
Figure 36. Histogram of 4.6 Unmanned. Figure 37. Histogram of 4.6 Manned. 
 
Mann-Whitney U Test 
 A Mann-Whitney U Test concluded that both UAS and Manned respondents 
indicated moderate risk given the scenario. However, no statistically significant 
differences exist between groups (U =615.50, P = .31).  Therefore, the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected based on this statement. 
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4.7 Please rate the risk involved with mid-air collisions. (0-10) 
Descriptive Statistics 
Responses to the statement “please rate the risk involved with mid-air collisions” 
were collected from twenty-five (92.6 percent) of the unmanned participants and fifty-
eight (96.7 percent) of the manned participants.   Both groups, unmanned (M = 4.04, SD 
= 3.48) and manned (M = 2.79, SD = 2.88), indicated a low to moderate level of risk 
(Figures 38 and 39).   
  
Figure 38. Histogram of 4.7 Unmanned. Figure 39. Histogram of 4.7 Manned. 
 
Mann-Whitney U Test 
 A Mann-Whitney U Test concluded that while both UAS and Manned 
respondents indicated low to moderate risk given the scenario, however, no statistically 
significant differences exist between groups (U =576.50, P = .13).  Therefore, the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected based on this statement. 
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4.8 Please rate the risk involved with flight in moderate or higher 
turbulence. (0-10) 
Descriptive Statistics 
Responses to the statement “please rate the risk involved with flight in moderate 
or higher turbulence” were collected from twenty-two (81.2 percent) of the unmanned 
participants and Fifty-five (91.7 percent) of the manned participants.  Both groups, 
unmanned (M = 4.82, SD = 2.36) and manned (M = 4.38, SD = 2.11), indicated a 
moderate level of risk (Figures 40 and 41).  
  
Figure 40. Histogram of 4.8 Unmanned. Figure 41. Histogram of 4.8 Manned. 
 
Mann-Whitney U Test 
 A Mann-Whitney U Test concluded that while both UAS and Manned 
respondents indicated moderate risk given the scenario, however, no statistically 
significant differences exist between groups (U =554.50, P = .56).  Therefore, the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected based on this statement. 
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4.9 Please rate the risk involved with losing primary navigation systems 
(GPS, FMS, VOR, etc.) (0-10) 
Descriptive Statistics 
Responses to the statement “please rate the risk involved with losing primary 
navigation systems (GPS, FMS, VOR, etc.)” were collected from twenty-six (96.3 
percent) of the unmanned participants and Fifty-four (90.0 percent) of the manned 
participants.  Both groups, unmanned (M = 5.31, SD = 2.83) and manned (M = 5.91, SD 
= 2.51), indicated a moderate level of risk (Figures 42 and 43).   
  
Figure 42. Histogram of 4.9 Unmanned. Figure 43. Histogram of 4.9 Manned. 
 
Mann-Whitney U Test 
 A Mann-Whitney U Test concluded that while both UAS and Manned 
respondents indicated moderate risk given the scenario, however, no statistically 
significant differences exist between groups (U =610.50, P = .34).  Therefore, the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected based on this statement. 
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Research Question 3: Is there a noticeable difference in safety culture when 
comparing manned and unmanned organizations? 
Descriptive 
 The participants’ responses to the following eleven survey items were 
used to evaluate differences in unmanned and manned organizational safety culture.  
Each of these items was presented in Likert type statements.  Items identified as “5.X” 
ranged from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree.” “agree,” “neutral,” and “disagree,” 
made up the three middle selections. Items identified as “6.X” ranged from “always” to 
“never.” “Most of the time,” “about half the time,” and “sometimes,” completed middle 
selections. A “not applicable” option was available for participants.  When selected, “not 
applicable” options were treated as missing responses.  Survey items for the third 
research question had a 97.2 percent response rate (Table 9).  
Table 9. Research Question Three Survey Items. 
Survey Item 
Identifier 
Response 
Rate Survey Item 
5.1 100 percent Your organization readily plans for emergency 
situations. 
5.2 98.9 percent Your organization promotes prompt reporting of any 
emergency or safety concerns or issues. 
5.3 97.7 percent Part of your flight planning includes planning for 
contingency or emergency situations. i.e., alternate 
airports, lost communications, etc. 
5.4 95.4 percent Your organization provides a plan for responding to 
an emergency landing off airport. 
5.7 98.9 percent Your training included a section on aircraft systems.  
Enough for you to be able to troubleshoot minor 
systems related issues independently. 
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Table 9. cont. 
Survey Item 
Identifier 
Response 
Rate Survey Item 
5.9 94.3 percent As the PIC of a completed flight, you are responsible 
for writing up any known discrepancies that occurred 
before, during, or after your flight. 
5.10 96.6 percent Your training included sufficient instruction of the 
requirements of operating in the national airspace 
system per the Federal Aviation Administrations.  To 
the extent that you, as the PIC, can reteach another of 
your peers. 
6.2 97.7 percent Your organization produces and adheres to a strict set 
of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). 
6.5 97.7 percent Your organization values safety over mission 
success. 
6.9 96.6 percent Your organization is proactive, rather than reactive, 
in developing safety standards and initiatives. 
6.10 95.4 percent Safety standards are well distributed to your entire 
organization to include, pilots, maintenance 
personnel, operations, etc. 
 
Method One – Survey Items Combined into Mean Score 
 In order to standardize the responses so that scores one through five correlated 
with increasing safety concerns, items 6.9 and 6.10 were re-coded to the inverse of the 
original data. Once standardized, the survey items were computed via the compute 
variables function to provide the mean safety culture score (MSCS).  
Normality Testing 
The MSCS was then tested for normality (Figure 44).  Based on the histogram 
depicting positive skewness, it was determined that the MSCS results were not normally 
distributed.  Transformations were attempted; however, normality could not be achieved 
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to a relatively acceptable level (Figures 45, 46, and 47).  Therefore, no further parametric 
statistics were analyzed.    
  
Figure 44. MSCS no Transformation. Figure 45. MSCS Log10 Transformation. 
  
Figure 46. MSCS Reciprocal 
Transformation. 
Figure 47. MSCS Sqrt. Transformation. 
 
Method Two – Individual Variable Analysis 
 The second method of data analysis did not correct for normality; instead it 
utilized non-parametric testing to assess relationships.  Each of the 11 survey items was 
analyzed individually with general descriptive statistics followed by the Mann-Whitney 
independent samples test.   
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5.1 Your organization readily plans for emergency situations. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Responses to the statement “your organization readily plans for emergency 
situations” were collected from twenty-seven (100.0 percent) of the unmanned 
participants and Sixty (100.0 percent) of the manned participants.  Both groups, 
unmanned (M = 1.48, SD = .89) and manned (M = 1.20, SD = .40), agreed with the 
statement; indicating a low safety concern in their organization (Figures 48 and 49).  
  
Figure 48. Histogram of 5.1 Unmanned. Figure 49. Histogram of 5.1 Manned. 
 
Mann-Whitney U Test 
 A Mann-Whitney U Test concluded that both groups agreed with the statement 
and no statistically significant differences exist between groups (U =690.00, P = .14).  
Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected based on this statement. 
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5.2 Your organization promotes prompt reporting of any emergency or 
safety concerns or issues. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Responses to the statement “your organization promotes prompt reporting of any 
emergency or safety concerns or issues” were collected from twenty-seven (100.0 
percent) of the unmanned participants and fifty-nine (98.3 percent) of the manned 
participants responded.  Both groups, unmanned (M = 1.48, SD = .98) and manned (M = 
1.22, SD = .67), agreed with the statement; indicating a low safety concern in their 
organization (Figures 50 and 51).   
  
Figure 50. Histogram of 5.2 Unmanned. Figure 51. Histogram of 5.2 Manned. 
 
Mann-Whitney U Test 
 A Mann-Whitney U Test concluded that both groups agreed with the statement 
and no statistically significant differences exist between groups (U =671.00, P = .09).  
Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected based on this statement. 
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5.3 Part of your flight planning includes planning for contingency or 
emergency situations. i.e., alternate airports, lost communications, etc. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Responses to the statement “part of your flight planning includes planning for 
contingency or emergency situations. i.e., alternate airports, lost communications, etc.” 
were collected from twenty-five (92.6 percent) of the unmanned participants and sixty 
(100.0 percent) of the manned participants.  Both groups, unmanned (M = 1.40, SD = 
.91) and manned (M = 1.18, SD = .39), agreed with the statement; indicating a low safety 
concern in their organization (Figures 52 and 53). 
  
Figure 52. Histogram of 5.3 Unmanned. Figure 53. Histogram of 5.3 Manned. 
 
Mann-Whitney U Test 
 A Mann-Whitney U Test concluded that both groups agreed with the statement 
and no statistically significant differences exist between groups (U =696.50, P = .46).  
Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected based on this statement. 
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5.4 Your organization provides a plan for responding to an emergency 
landing off airport. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Responses to the statement “your organization provides a plan for responding to 
an emergency landing off-airport” were collected from twenty-four (88.9 percent) of the 
unmanned participants and fifty-nine (98.3 percent) of the manned participants.  Both 
groups, unmanned (M = 1.79, SD = 1.22) and manned (M = 1.49, SD = .77), agreed with 
the statement; indicating a low safety concern in their organization (Figures 54 and 55).  
  
Figure 54. Histogram of 5.4 Unmanned. Figure 55. Histogram of 5.4 Manned. 
 
Mann-Whitney U Test 
 A Mann-Whitney U Test concluded that both groups agreed with the statement 
and no statistically significant differences exist between groups (U =654.50, P = .53).  
Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected based on this statement. 
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5.7 Your training included a section on aircraft systems.  Enough for you 
to be able to troubleshoot minor systems related issues independently. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Responses to the statement “your training included a section on aircraft systems.  
Enough for you to be able to troubleshoot minor systems related issues independently” 
were collected from twenty-six (96.3 percent) of the unmanned participants and sixty 
(100.0 percent) of the manned participants.  Both groups, unmanned (M = 1.31, SD = 
.55) and manned (M = 1.35, SD = .73), agreed with the statement; indicating a low safety 
concern in their organization (Figures 56 and 57).   
  
Figure 56. Histogram of 5.7 Unmanned. Figure 57. Histogram of 5.7 Manned. 
 
Mann-Whitney U Test 
 A Mann-Whitney U Test concluded that both groups agreed with the statement 
and no statistically significant differences exist between groups (U =778.00, P = .98).  
Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected based on this statement. 
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5.9 As the PIC of a completed flight, you are responsible for writing up 
any known discrepancies that occurred before, during, or after your flight. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Responses to the statement “as the PIC of a completed flight; you are responsible 
for writing up any known discrepancies that occurred before, during, or after your flight” 
were collected from twenty-four (88.9 percent) of the unmanned participants and fifty-
eight (96.7 percent) of the manned participants.  Both groups, unmanned (M = 1.08, SD 
= .41) and manned (M = 1.12, SD = .33), agreed with the statement; indicating a low 
safety concern in their organization (Figures 58 and 59).   
  
Figure 58. Histogram of 5.9 Unmanned. Figure 59. Histogram of 5.9 Manned. 
 
Mann-Whitney U Test 
 A Mann-Whitney U Test concluded that both groups agreed with the statement 
and no statistically significant differences exist between groups (U =644.50, P = .31).  
Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected based on this statement. 
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5.10 Your training included sufficient instruction of the requirements of 
operating in the national airspace system per the Federal Aviation 
Administrations.  To the extent that you, as the PIC, can reteach another of 
your peers. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Responses to the statement “your training included sufficient instruction of the 
requirements of operating in the national airspace system per the Federal Aviation 
Administrations.  To the extent that you, as the PIC, can reteach another of your peers” 
were collected from twenty-four (88.9 percent) of the unmanned participants and sixty 
(100.0 percent) of the manned participants.  Both groups, unmanned (M = 1.33, SD = 
.82) and manned (M = 1.27, SD = .52), agreed with the statement; indicating a low safety 
concern in their organization (Figures 60 and 61).   
  
Figure 60. Histogram of 5.10 Unmanned. Figure 61. Histogram of 5.10 Manned. 
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Mann-Whitney U Test 
 A Mann-Whitney U Test concluded that both groups agreed with the statement 
and no statistically significant differences exist between groups (U =690.00, P = .68).  
Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected based on this statement. 
6.2 Your organization produces and adheres to a strict set of Standard 
Operating Procedures (SOPs). 
Descriptive Statistics 
Responses to the statement “your organization produces and adheres to a strict set 
of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)” were collected from twenty-six (96.3 percent) 
of the unmanned participants and fifty-nine (98.3 percent) of the manned participants.  
Both groups, unmanned (M = 1.19, SD = .40) and manned (M = 1.36, SD = .55), agreed 
with the statement; indicating a low safety concern in their organization (Figures 62 and 
63). 
  
Figure 62. Histogram of 6.2 Unmanned. Figure 63. Histogram of 6.2 Manned. 
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Mann-Whitney U Test 
 A Mann-Whitney U Test concluded that both groups agreed with the statement 
and no statistically significant differences exist between groups (U =662.50, P = .20).  
Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected based on this statement. 
6.5 Your organization values safety over mission success. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Responses to the statement “your organization values safety over mission 
success” were collected from twenty-five (92.6 percent) of the unmanned participants and 
sixty (100.0 percent) of the manned participants.  Both groups, unmanned (M = 1.32, SD 
= .69) and manned (M = 1.52, SD = .89), agreed with the statement; indicating a low 
safety concern in their organization (Figures 64 and 65).     
  
Figure 64. Histogram of 6.5 Unmanned. Figure 65. Histogram of 6.5 Manned. 
 
Mann-Whitney U Test 
 A Mann-Whitney U Test concluded that both groups agreed with the statement 
and no statistically significant differences exist between groups (U =670.50, P = .34).  
Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected based on this statement. 
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6.9 Your organization is proactive, rather than reactive, in developing 
safety standards and initiatives. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Responses to the statement “your organization is proactive, rather than reactive, in 
developing safety standards and initiatives” were collected from twenty-six (96.3 
percent) of the unmanned participants and fifty-eight (96.7 percent) of the manned 
participants.  Both groups, unmanned (M = 1.81, SD = .90) and manned (M = 1.66, SD = 
.98), agreed with the statement; indicating a low safety concern in their organization 
(Figures 66 and 67).   
  
Figure 66. Histogram of 6.9 Unmanned. Figure 67. Histogram of 6.9 Manned. 
 
Mann-Whitney U Test 
 A Mann-Whitney U Test concluded that both groups agreed with the statement 
and no statistically significant differences exist between groups (U =656.50, P = .30).  
Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected based on this statement. 
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6.10 Safety standards are well distributed to your entire organization to 
include, pilots, maintenance personnel, operations, etc. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Responses to the statement “safety standards are well distributed to your entire 
organization to include, pilots, maintenance personnel, operations, etc.” were collected 
from twenty-five (92.6 percent) of the unmanned participants and fifty-eight (96.7 
percent) of the manned participants.  Both groups, unmanned (M = 1.60, SD = .91) and 
manned (M = 1.33, SD = .60), agreed with the statement; indicating a low safety concern 
in their organization (Figures 68 and 69). 
  
Figure 68. Histogram of 6.10 Unmanned. Figure 69. Histogram of 6.10 Manned. 
 
Mann-Whitney U Test 
 A Mann-Whitney U Test concluded that both groups agreed with the statement 
and no statistically significant differences exist between groups (U =620.50, P = .20).  
Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected based on this statement. 
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
 Upon review of the literature and collected data, there is no significant difference 
in how safety is approached when comparing manned and unmanned aviators.  Both 
groups tended to select responses that correlated with the safer or less risky options.  The 
following discussion will walk through the fundamental data analysis pertaining to each 
research question, discuss limitations of the study, and suggest areas for future research. 
Research Questions 
Research Question I 
 The first research question asked how the perspective of safety differed between 
the manned and unmanned groups. A combination of nine survey items were analyzed 
two ways in an attempt to answer research question one.  The one-way ANOVA 
performed on the Mean Safety Perception Rating (MSPR) yielded no significance 
between the two groups.  The mean scores between unmanned (M=1.56) and manned 
(M=1.58) were nearly the same.  Both groups indicated a healthy regard for safety.  The 
second method looked at each individual survey item for significance.  No significance 
was found for any of the nine survey items that underwent non-parametric statistic 
testing.  The answer to research question one based on the results of this study is that 
there is no difference in how safety is perceived when comparing manned and unmanned 
aviators.  Lack of significance in the statistical analysis of this survey may have been a 
result of the data collection tool.  The survey allowed for broad distribution to a diverse 
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population.  However, it seems unlikely that participants felt any danger or stress during 
the survey.  Different results might be obtained if the participants took part in various 
simulations that exhibited the characteristics of the safety scenarios presented in the 
survey.  It is also likely that the participant’s experience in manned aviation resulted in 
higher regard for safety.  Of the unmanned participant’s, eighty percent indicated some 
level of manned flight experience, with a majority having over one-hundred flight hours.  
As the unmanned industry continues to grow, the probability increases that unmanned 
operators may have little to no manned flight experience.  The cost of manned flight 
training as a requirement for unmanned operations may inhibit industries looking to 
benefit from the low operating expense of small unmanned aircraft.  Real estate firms, 
first response units, precision agriculture, drone racing, are just a few of the industries 
that benefit inexpensive, and sometimes disposable, unmanned aircraft.  Bringing in 
participants that are involved with unmanned operations, with little to no manned flight 
experience would be an excellent place to continue the safety perception discussion.      
Research Question II 
 Research question two assesses the difference in how manned and unmanned 
aviators perceive risk, given the difference in physical risk.  Similar to research question 
one, question two was analyzed using both parametric and non-parametric statistical 
tests.  The parametric test was conducted using a combined mean score for each 
participant across each survey item.  The one-way ANOVA yielded no significance and 
comparing the mean between unmanned (M=3.89) and manned (M=3.78) tells a similar 
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story.  Method two utilized a non-parametric test to examine each variable on its own.  Of 
the nine items analyzed only one returned results suggesting that a statistically significant 
difference exists between unmanned and manned aviators.   
Survey item 4.5 asked participants to rate the risk involved with inadvertent flight 
into inclement weather.  The Mann-Whitney U test reported that there was indeed a 
statistical difference between how unmanned (M=5.13) and manned (M=3.41) perceived 
the risk involved with inadvertent flight into weather.  It was surprising to see that the 
unmanned group responded with the higher rate of risk.  A likely answer to this lies not in 
the differences between aviators, rather in what equipment they are operating.  Many 
small UAS must be operated within line of sight, and inadvertent flight into inclement 
weather would mean the partial or complete loss of situational awareness.  Further 
analysis shows that unmanned aviators having served in the military (M=7.00) rated this 
risk higher than unmanned aviators that had not served in the military (M=4.31).  
Military UAS are typically constructed using composite materials laminated together to 
create a lightweight, durable airframe.  However, these materials can be compromised 
during prolonged flight into inclement weather.  Further research is required to determine 
the impact of inadvertent flight into inclement weather on unmanned aviators’ risk 
perception.  
Overall, the answer to research question two is that there is no significant 
difference in risk perception between manned and unmanned aviators.  Similar to the first 
research question, participants were asked to subjectively rate risk while, most likely, 
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sitting in a low-risk environment.  Simulations or inducing different types of stress may 
provide more insight into how unmanned and manned aviators perceive risk.  The risk 
tolerance of the participants may have also influenced the results.  Participants with a 
higher tolerance for risk likely exhibit a safer perception of risk. Future variations of this 
study should find a way to measure risk tolerance and apply those findings to the 
individual's risk perception.   
Research Question III 
 Research question three looks at the difference in unmanned and manned safety 
culture within their respective organizations.  As with the previous two questions, 
question three was analyzed in two methods using both parametric and non-parametric 
tests.  The first method used a one-way ANOVA and did not result in a statistically 
significant difference between unmanned (M=1.49) and manned (M=1.33) aviators in 
regards to how safe they perceive their organizations.  The second method used the non-
parametric Mann-Whitney U independent samples test to analyze each of the eleven 
variables on their own.  All eleven tests returned results that showed there was no 
statistically significant difference in unmanned and manned safety cultures.  While this 
result indicates a positive safety culture in general, many of the factors that affected the 
first and second research question should also be considered.  Similar background 
experience between groups, low-stress testing environment, and subjective self-
assessments may have contributed to the lack of statistical significance between groups. 
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Limitation of Study 
 This study was limited by several factors.  Data accessibility, population size, 
population type, the maturity of the UAS industry, and accessibility to participants 
limited general applicability of this study and may have influenced the results.  
Population Size 
 While the split of manned (n=60) and unmanned (n=27) may represent an 
accurate manned to unmanned pilot ratio in the real world, a more significant overall 
population would have allowed for higher power in the statistical analysis.  The small 
sample size may have impacted the significance of the statistical analysis.  Future studies 
replicating a similar analysis should aim for a more substantial total population. 
Population Type 
 The small sample size also limited the types of participants, creating a narrower 
view of the manned and unmanned industries.  This limitation likely exists due to 
difficulties in distributing the data collection tool to a diverse population.  Accessibility 
and time constraints added to the difficulties in diversifying the manned and unmanned 
aviator groups. A more substantial population with an extended data collection period 
would have allowed for a more accurate statistical analysis. 
Data Collection Method 
 Given the small size of the population, the survey tool used to collect data may 
have limited the ability of statistical analysis to determine differences between groups.  If 
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sample size could not be increased in future studies, simulations or interviews may help 
to verify the results of the survey. 
 The survey tool inherently has its own limitations as well.  It is possible that 
participants were not completely honest in their responses and, consciously or 
subconsciously, selected an answer they deemed more acceptable.  In an attempt to 
combat this, the anonymity of the individual was guaranteed.  Participants may have also 
lacked interest in the topic and may not have thoroughly read or comprehended the 
statements or may have selected responses based on a particular bias.   
The maturity of UAS Industry 
 The relative young age of the unmanned industry limits the potential sample size 
and population.  The available pool of unmanned operators may have been suppressed 
due to regulatory constraints that keep unmanned aircraft from operating in the NAS.  A 
more mature industry would have provided a diversified population in comparison to this 
study.  For example, there were very few unmanned aviator participants’ that did not also 
have manned experience.  In the not too distant future, there may be a more significant 
number of solely unmanned aviators.  
Future Research and Considerations 
 The future of unmanned aircraft is promising, and according to this study, the 
industry has the correct mindset with regards to safety.  That being said, the limitations of 
this study warrant a review of the results when the UAS industry has matured and gained 
more significant operational access to the NAS.  
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 Further research would benefit from more advanced data collection methods.  
Side by side simulations, non-flight related decision-making tests, and other tools could 
be used to compare further how the two groups regard safety.  While understanding the 
safety culture in organizations provides a broad analysis of the aviation industry, it might 
not be critical to assess is future studies.  Instead, more attention should be placed on 
safety and risk perception among aviators and other support personnel.  As mentioned 
above, future research should find a way to measure risk tolerance as well.  That factor 
may add weight to how participants perceive risk and safety.  
This study’s scope was limited to aviators.  However, in both industries, there are 
multiple layers of support to include but not limited to mechanics, ground support 
personnel, flight dispatchers, and schedulers.  Understanding how the safety attitude of 
these personnel affect the operation may also help in ensuring a safe operating 
environment for both manned and unmanned aviators and would be an exciting subject of 
future research.  
Conclusion 
 This study attempted to predict potential problem areas in the fast-growing 
unmanned industry.  The literature review revealed that several UAS accidents or 
mishaps resulted from pilot or operator error.  The benefits of gaining knowledge of why 
these accidents occurred may help to smooth the path towards UAS integration into the 
National Airspace System. This small pilot study is a small step in analyzing how the 
unmanned and manned industries are similar and how they might differ.  Understanding 
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these relationships will assist in ensuring public perception remains favorable so that 
UAS may prosper for years to come. 
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